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Making Sense of the War in Afghanistan 
 
 
Abstract 
What does a reading of Karl Weick’s work add to our understanding of strategy? To address 
this question I first outline some of the principal ideas that inform the Weick-inspired 
sensemaking perspective – sensemaking, organizing and enactment. Second, drawing on 
Martin (2014) these concepts are applied in order to analyze the West’s strategy failure in 
Afghanistan, focusing in particular on the activities of the British and Americans in Helmand 
province. American and British strategizing, I argue, was hamstrung by a failure to understand 
adequately the history, context, people, actions and events in which they were embroiled: that 
is, there was a failure of sensemaking. This exploration suggests the value of sensemaking 
theory not just to academics but also to corporate strategists and military commanders. 
Although the nature of this failure and its implications for the West’s strategies are analyzed 
primarily with reference to Weick, I draw also on the broader sensemaking literature especially 
that which recognizes the linguistic, and in particular narrative character of sensemaking 
processes. Finally, some limitations of this analysis and the sensemaking perspective generally 
are briefly considered.  
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Lauded both for his theorizing and pragmatic insights, Karl Weick is one of the most influential 
thinkers in strategic management (Ramos-Rodriguez and Ruiz-Navarro, 2004) and 
organization studies (Sutcliffe et al., 2006). Gioia (2006, p.1710) has argued that Weick, 
undoubtedly ‘…“changed the conversation” of our field’, and Czarniawska (2006, p.1672) has 
praised his works as ‘…a source of wisdom and consolation’. Drawing on a broad range of 
ideas, associated with scholars as diverse as Allport, Ashby, Bateson, Heidegger, Husserl, and 
Schultz, among others, Weick has helped to refocus a generation of academic social scientists 
on processes rather than structures and organizing rather than organizations. While he is 
associated principally with what is generally referred to as the ‘sensemaking perspective’ 
(Maitlis and Christianson, 2014; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2014), he has also contributed to 
diverse other literatures including those on loose coupling, organizations as interpretive 
systems, improvisation, organizing for high reliability, and requisite variety (Weick, 1969, 
1979, 1995). Perhaps most resonant with contemporary strategy scholarship is his 
‘phenomenological emphasis on lived experience’ (Sutcliffe et al., 2006, p.1574) and 
recognition of ‘…the centrality of language and interaction in the social construction of 
organizational realities’ (Eisenberg, 2006, p.1693).  
 
In this paper, I foreground some of the ideas of Karl Weick and discuss how they are relevant 
to our understanding of strategy, drawing principally on Martin’s (2014) analysis of what went 
wrong with American and British strategizing in Afghanistani. The key argument that Martin 
(2014) makes, and which I explore and elaborate further, is that American and British strategy 
implementation was hamstrung by a failure to understand adequately the history, context, 
people, actions and events in which they were embroiled: that is, there was a failure of 
sensemaking. The nature of this failure and its implications for the West’s strategies are 
analyzed primarily with reference to Weick, but I draw also, though to a more limited extent, 
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on the broader sensemaking literature, in particular that which recognizes the linguistic, 
especially narrative character of sensemaking processes (Boje, 1991; Brown, 2000; Gephart, 
1993). No single account, of course, can do full justice to the complexities inherent in a 
prolonged series of military interventions fought over many years across a large country, and 
nor is it feasible to survey meaningfully every concept relevant to strategy associated with Karl 
Weick’s work, and my aims here are appropriately modestii.  
 
I begin by outlining some of the key features of the Weick-inspired sensemaking movement 
and consider how they have been employed in the strategy literature. An account of my research 
design is then followed by several sections which provide an analysis of the West’s strategic 
failure in Afghanistan from a sensemaking perspective. This exploration shows the value of 
Weick’s work for academics, practising corporate strategists and military commanders. 
Finally, I consider weaknesses of the sensemaking literature and draw some brief conclusions.  
 
1. Karl Weick, Strategy and Organizing 
Karl Weick is most closely associated with the ‘sensemaking perspective’ which has its origins 
in late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholarship (Dewey, 1922; James, 1890; cf. 
Maitlis and Christianson, 2014). The use of the term ‘perspective’ is deliberate, and 
symptomizes that there is no single theory of sensemaking, merely ‘…a set of ideas with 
explanatory possibilities’ (Weick, 1995, p.ix). Contemporary interest in sensemaking dates 
from the 1960s, especially with Weick (1969) together with others such as Garfinkel (1967) 
and Polanyi (1967), who sought to explain how people experience ‘reality’ and how meanings 
are socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Initially, Weick took a strong 
cognitivist position: ‘…organizations exist largely in the mind, and…what ties an organization 
together is what ties thoughts together’ (Weick and Bougon, 1986, p.102-3). More recently, 
5 
 
though, Weick has embedded his perspective in social constructivist theorizing that highlights 
the role of language in meaning production (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2014; Weick, et. al., 1995), 
a move that has been mirrored by the broader sensemaking community: ‘…in most current 
writing organizational sensemaking is …understood as fundamentally concerned with 
language’ (Maitlis and Christianson (2014, p.81). Much attention has been devoted to 
narratives as ‘…the primary form by which human experience is made meaningful’ 
(Polkinghorne, 1988, p.1) leading to studies emphasizing the polyphonic nature of 
sensemaking in organizing (Abolafia, 2010; Brown et al., 2008; Currie and Brown, 2003).  
 
There have been many attempts to capture adequately and tersely the kernel of Weick’s 
perspective on sensemaking (e.g., Brown et. al., 2015; Holt and Cornelissen, 2014; Maitlis and 
Christianson, 2014; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2014). These tend to focus on three interlinked 
(and to some extent overlapping) notions sensemaking, organizing, and enactment. 
Sensemaking involves action (enactment) which is made sense of retrospectively by focusing 
on cues which are extracted, labelled and connected; this reduces equivocality, and through 
talk which sustains interaction accomplishes organizing. This rather dense rendering of 
Weick’s position requires unpacking.  
 
Sensemaking 
Weick, and the broader sensemaking community, offer somewhat distinct characterizations of 
sensemaking. At its most general, sensemaking is a generic term that refers to diverse processes 
of interpretation, action and meaning production whereby people ‘structure the unknown’ 
(Waterman, 1990, p.41), reduce equivocality, and (re)produce their worlds. A more ‘micro’ 
perspective on these processes suggests that sensemaking involves a frame (such as an ideology 
or theory of action), a cue (that which is actively ‘noticed’ in present moments of experience) 
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and a connection (a relationship between the frame and the cue which creates meaning) (Weick, 
1995, p.111). This sensemaking depends crucially on identity, is retrospective, enactive of 
social environments, social (‘sensemaking is never solitary’ (Weick, 1995, p.40)), ongoing 
(‘People are always in the middle of things’ (Weick, 1995, p.43)), focused on and by extracted 
cues (‘To establish a point of reference…is a consequential act’ (Weick, 1995, p.50)), and 
driven by plausibility rather than accuracy (‘…what is necessary in sensemaking is a good 
story’ (Weick, 1995, p.61)). Moreover, sensemaking is constitutive of organizing which 
emerges through sensemaking: sensemaking is a matter of authoring not just interpretation, it 
is a means of ‘…creation as well as discovery’ (Weick, 1995, p.8).  
 
Organizing 
Rather than a single, simple definition of the temporary and dynamic nature of organizing, 
Weick provides several distinctive though overlapping characterizations of it which emphasize 
its behavioural, cognitive and linguistic/communicative features. Organizing is associated 
firstly with the behaviours which form its ‘substance’ or ‘raw material’ (Weick, 1979, p.4). On 
this reading, organizing refers to those ongoing improvisational practices by which 
equivocality – ambiguity due to multiple and often conflicting interpretations – is resolved (or 
reduced) ‘…in an enacted environment by means of interlocked behaviors embedded in 
conditionally related processes’ (Weick, 1969, p.91). Second, organizing involves ‘…unique 
intersubjective understandings’ being ‘…picked up, perpetuated, and enlarged’ by those who 
did not participate in their construction such that people can substitute for one another, albeit 
with ‘some loss of joint understanding’ (Weick, 2005, p.72). Here it is ‘generalizing’ that is 
‘the prototypic act of organizing’ as people ‘hold things together’ through the assignment of 
‘familiar categories’ (Weick, 2006, p.1731). Third, recognizing that organizations are talked 
into existence, Weick (2006, p.1725) insists that organizing inheres in ‘Repetitive cycles of 
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texts, conversations, and agents’. Organizing may involve everything from mutual effort to 
transactive memory, but it is only through continuous communication – processes of arguing, 
expecting, committing and manipulating – that we can ‘see what we say’, resulting in the 
generic subjectivity that reassures people ‘…that if they do not look too closely, the world 
makes sense and things are under control’ (Weick, 1995, p.170).  
 
Enactment 
Integral to Weick’s understanding of both organizing and sensemaking is his conception of 
enactment, which refers to those processes by which people create (enact) events and structures 
through their action. This is consonant with other social scientific theorizing. For example, 
Garfinkel (1967: 115) asserts that an ‘…actor’s own actions are first order determinants of the 
sense that situations have, in which, literally speaking, actors find themselves’. Weick, though, 
elaborates on this basic premise in several interesting ways. In acting, people ‘…create the 
materials that become the constraints and opportunities they face’ (Weick, 1995, p.31), and so 
enactment is in effect a ‘bet’ that an unfolding action will at some point in the future ‘have 
made sense’ (Weick, 2006, p.1729). Linguistic acts are of particular importance in 
organizations as situations are ‘…talked into being through interactive exchanges of 
organizational members’ (Taylor and Van Every, 2000, p.33-4). Key to these processes are 
faith – for example that we are right and will not fail – which provides the energy and rationale 
for action, and improvisation, by which people are able to take the leap from apparently 
significant ‘fact’ to the authorship of complex ‘realities’. These are processes in which actions 
and perceptions ‘validate one another in ways that resemble self-fulfilling prophecies’ (Weick, 
1995, p.163) meaning that ‘People create what they expect to find’ (Weick, 1995, p.35). Indeed, 
in a world which is both unknowable and unpredictable it makes sense for action temporarily 
to displace wisdom because ‘…we need to act to see what we think’ (Weick, 2006, p.1730).  
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Although cohered by reference to Weick whose scholarship acts as a centripetal force, the 
sensemaking perspective continues to be explored and extended by a substantial community. 
This has led to studies located in ever more diverse settings, ranging from staff in paediatric 
cardiac surgery (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003), computer games development teams (Brown et 
al., 2008), newcomer socialization (Louis, 1981), jazz groups (Humphreys et. al., 2013), 
students’ attempts to make sense of examinations (Patriotta and Brown, 2011) and counter-
terrorist operations (Colville, et al., 2013). In this regard, it is worth noting that such is Weick’s 
range and influence that he is (perhaps surprisingly) well published in accounting journals 
(Swieringa & Weick, 1982; Weick, 1983) and (less unexpectedly) a major focus of debate for 
academic accountants (Kalle & Strömsten, 2012; Libby, 1983; Miller & Power, 2013). While 
at first blush this theorizing might seem to be of limited applicability, it has in fact proved 
hugely generative, and according to Sandberg and Tsoukas (2014) it has most extensively been 
applied in studies of strategy and organizational change.  
 
The Sensemaking Perspective and Strategy Research 
Considerable attention has been paid to processes of sensemaking in the context of large-scale 
strategic change, especially how leaders seek to manage the interpretive schemes of 
organizational members (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Brown and Humphreys, 2006; Mantere 
et al., 2012). The attempts by leaders to mould the understandings of their subordinates, not 
always successfully, have been examined in, for example, a corporate spin-off (Corley and 
Gioia, 2004), an effort to transform a higher education college into a university (Humphreys 
and Brown, 2002) and mergers and acquisitions (Monin et. al., 2013). Other substantial allied 
bodies of research have surveyed issues of strategy and sensemaking with reference to 
organizational learning (Catino and Patriotta, 2013) and creativity and innovation (Jay, 2013), 
which sensemaking is said, generally to facilitate and improve. While some maintain that the 
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ability to manage meaning is a key leadership capability (Shamir, 2007), more often than not 
careful analysis reveals that processes of strategic change are accompanied by diverse and 
fragmented understandings among individuals and groups whose sensemaking is idiosyncratic 
(Maitlis, 2005; Walsh and Bartunek, 2011). One consistent finding from this research is that in 
those situations where sensemaking is inadequate or problematic there is a greatly increased 
chance of strategy failure (Nag et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2005).  
 
Of particular note is that processes of sensemaking are key to the strategy-as-practice 
movement and its agenda ‘…to cast light on micro-processes of strategy-making, to link the 
micro to the macro, and to reveal what strategists actually do’ (Brown and Thompson, 2013, 
p.1143). Indeed, being concerned primarily with ‘the doing of strategy’ and defining ‘strategy’ 
as ‘a situated socially accomplished activity’ (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009, p.69-70; 
Whittington, 2006), makes processes of sensemaking integral to a perspective that seeks to 
further ‘…the study of social complexity’ (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009, p.70). As Neill and 
Rose (2007, p.305) have argued, ‘Confronting complex situations is the hallmark of strategic 
decision-making’, and this has led researchers to focus on strategy scenarios with high 
equivocality in which confusion and disagreement abound. This emphasis on sensemaking 
practices has become pronounced as sensemaking theorists, most notably Weick, have come 
to emphasize the linguistic character of social sensemaking, the linguistic turn forming much 
of the ground on which the strategy-as-practice literature has been built (Carter et al., 2008a,b, 
2010, 2011). Empirical studies and extensive theorizing has focused on how sensemaking, 
strategizing and strategy implementation are entwined in narratives/stories (Boje, 1991; 
Brown, 2006; Brown and Humphreys, 2003), metaphor (Cornelissen, 2012), and other local 
and situated micro-discursive practices (Rouleau and Balogun, 2011; Vaara, 2003).  
 
10 
 
2. Research Methods 
The primary source on which I draw is Martin (2014) which tells the story of the last thirty-
four years of conflict in Helmand province, Afghanistan, as related to him by Helmandi 
informants. The book, which is based on his doctoral thesis, draws on three forms of data. First, 
Martin’s experiences during 19 months of participant observation in Helmand as both a serving 
British Army Officer, (he was a cultural advisor), and as a researcher. Second, he conducted 
personally several series of interviews with key individuals, mostly men, none of whom were 
paid. These included 85 interviews conducted in Pushtu during 2011 and 2012 with tribal 
leaders, jihadi commanders, religious leaders, landowners, government and security officials 
and businessmen. The duration of these interviews varied between 30 minutes and 5 hours, and 
data were captured in hand written notes. He also conducted 11 interviews with NATO officials 
and an unspecified number of on–the–record interviews with ‘key Helmandi and Western 
personalities’ (Martin, 2014, p.13). Third, he made use of a data set collected by Farrell and 
Giustozzi which contained 50 interviews with Taliban commanders and 15 interviews with 
Helmandi notablesiii. Despite this huge effort and extensive data set he declares that ‘…at times 
it has felt like nothing more than catching snippets of rumours passing on the winds of 
Helmandi gossip’ (Martin, 2014, p.13)iv.  
 
Keen to emphasize his credentials as a sophisticatedly reflexive researcher he notes that some 
of his interviewees were working with forces attacking British and Afghan government 
personnel and that they  ‘…were often attempting to use me, either to gain lucrative ISAF [the 
International Security Assistance Force] contracts, or perhaps to spread disinformation’ 
(Martin, 2014, p.10). Somewhat contradictorily he notes that as a British Army officer he was 
‘as far as can be from being neutral’ and yet maintains that ‘…I have done my utmost to detach 
myself and remain objective in this analysis’ (Martin, 2014, p.14), which is indicative of the 
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curious position in which he found himself as both professional soldier and student. This is 
important in part because it highlights that Martin’s (2014) work cannot be assumed in any 
sense to be a factual or neutral account of ‘actual’ historical events. Rather, it is best regarded 
as an ‘artifact’ that makes use of a specific and finite data set, together with multiple authorial 
strategies of selection, assemblage and omission  to construct a highly personal set of 
understandings. Of course, the same is true of this paper, which I readily acknowledge is an 
‘artful product designed not just to inform but to persuade’ (Brown, 2000, p.50), and 
incorporates many of my own prejudices, for example, regarding what constitutes worthwhile 
text-based discursive research (Brown, 2004, 2005; Brown et al., 2012).  
 
My paper is not a ‘conventional’ discursive analysis of Martin (2014) but employs it to 
illustrate and to a lesser extent critique some of the ideas of Karl Weick. That said, this paper 
does draw on a rich vein of discourse analytic work in organization studies, especially that 
which has taken written texts (such as inquiry reports and web-sites) as its major source of data 
(e.g., Boudes and Laroche, 2009; Coupland and Brown, 2004; Sillince and Brown, 2009). This 
work is predicated on the assumption that quantitatively informed analyses of texts are of 
limited utility because ‘words and phrases do not come ready packaged with a specified 
delimited meaning’ (Parker, 2000, p.2), and that only a qualitative approach is able to highlight 
nuances of meaning (Hawkes, 1977). Accordingly, Martin’s book was first read carefully and 
extensive notes made on each chapter. This was a laborious task as while the narrative is mostly 
related in a time-linear manner, it is packed with a wealth of apparently marginal information 
and anecdotal material, and much is left partially or un-explained. As I undertook this analysis 
I sought to link descriptions of people, actions and events to the concepts and frameworks for 
understanding developed by Weick. These processes were, like other similar-type research, 
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more explorative and intuitive than conventionally ‘rigorous’, as I sought to make connections 
and write sections that were interesting, informative and (hopefully) generative.  
 
3. Making Sense of Strategy Failure: A case study of the war in Afghanistan 
From the chaos of civil war in Afghanistan arose a movement of religious clerics, the Taliban, 
who were ideologically committed to their interpretation of Islam and who promised to restore 
social order (for a glossary of terms and people and a timeline of events please refer to Tables 
1 and 2). To consolidate their position they ill-advisedly formed an alliance with Osama bin 
Laden and al-Qaeda, and following attacks against the US on 11 September 2001, American 
troops invaded Afghanistan driving the Taliban from power. An internally-backed Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), was set up under Hamid Karzai, recognized 
and supported by the international community. US Special Forces continued to locate and 
neutralize the vestiges of the Taliban, while assisting the Government in its efforts to rebuild 
the country. British troops deployed to Helmand, the largest province of Afghanistan, in 2006, 
as part of ISAF, in order, they said, to advance democracy and women’s rights, support the 
Government, deliver reconstruction and development, and disrupt the narcotics trade. By 2014, 
the year by which ISAF declared that its forces would be withdrawn, it was unclear that any of 
the international community’s objectives had been achieved: there had been little 
reconstruction, the economy was still based largely on opium, at a national level the same 
avaricious warlords had security control of the country, while at a local level in Helmand the 
same people still wielded guns in the villages.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 about here please 
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Strategic Sensemaking 
ISAF’s dominant sensemaking narrative. The official ISAF storyline, which framed British and 
American understandings, took the form of an ‘insurgency narrative’v which stated that 
‘…there is a legitimate Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), which 
is recognized and supported by the international community, but which is violently opposed 
by a movement of insurgents, called the Taliban, who have sanctuary in Quetta, Pakistan’ 
(Martin, 2014, p.195). This narrative had at least three important corollaries. First, it had a 
strong moral aspect; it depicted the Taliban as illegitimate, religiously inspired, and opposed 
to democracy and women’s rights which the GIRoA embodied and promoted. Second, it 
incorporated a particular view of both the Taliban and the Afghan government as distinct and 
relatively cohesive (if factionalized) organizations locked in a zero-sum battle for political 
control of Afghanistan. Third, it suggested (at least initially) that the Taliban were ‘…Maoist-
style insurgents from outside who were terrorizing the community’ (Martin, 2014, p.244); this 
was later modified to an extent, at least in terms of British thinking, as they came to understand 
the population as caught between the competing ‘offers’ of the Taliban and the Government. 
This sensemaking was strikingly different from that of the Afghan people.  
 
Helmandis’ dominant sensemaking narrative. Rather than an insurgency, the Helmandis 
understood what was happening as a continuing domestic civil war, with diverse embedded 
sub-conflicts, in which external powers, most notably the British and Americans, were 
participating to support their national interests. There were multiple strands to this narrative, 
most important of which was that until the arrival of the Americans the Taliban had been 
engaged in a struggle for political control with the Mujahidin commanders who had fought 
against the Sovietsvi. With the Taliban routed, the Mujahidin commanders, who retained old 
networks and access to considerable funds and weapons distributed by the CIA and US Special 
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Forces, thrived under Western patronage. Continuing conflict between those who affiliated 
with the Taliban and those who associated with the GIRoA was accompanied by other 
strugglesvii. Afghanistan is tribal, and the tribes, themselves internally differentiated, exist in a 
state of tension which leads often to violence. A strong spirit of individualism means that 
allegiances are fluid, and tribal differences are often overlaid by personal rivalries and petty 
jealousiesviii. Many disputes centre on control of the opium trade and the precious land and 
water that supports it, resulting in innumerable intertwined and seemingly irresolvable 
conflictsix. Moreover, external interference has long been a feature of Afghan history, and 
internal factions have become adept at manipulating outsiders to help them prosecute their local 
battles. 
 
These sensemaking stories constituted the distinct frames within which ISAF and Helmandis 
interpreted the same cues, leading to their increasingly divergent understandings of what was 
happening, and this had profound implications for Afghanistan. While relatively neglected by 
the strategy-as-practice community, there is incipient recognition that narratological practices 
are fundamental to comprehension of what strategists do (Fenton and Langley, 2011). As 
Brown and Thompson (2013, p.1144) make clear, narrative practices ‘…shape strategic 
realities and strategists’ subjectivities’, and these in turn have significant consequences for 
action. In this instance, the social reality implied by the ISAF narrative was enacted by its 
military forces on the ground, leading both to strategy failure and, self-defeatingly, the 
resurgence of the Taliban.   
 
Organizing: Strategy-in-Practice 
The insurgency narrative by which ISAF made sense of the situation in Afghanistan was 
associated closely with six key interleaved ‘strategies’ in Helmand: (i) to support and 
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strengthen the GIRoA and state apparatus (notably the police) and to promote good 
governance; (ii) to neutralize the Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants; (iii) to provide security for 
the civilian population; (iv) to rebuild Afghanistan and its infrastructure; (v) to disrupt the 
narcotics (specifically opium) industry; and (vi) to win the hearts and minds of the people. 
Based on ‘…almost zero knowledge of the environment they were operating in’ (Martin, 2014, 
p.112) the Americans and British set about implementing these strategies in practice.  
 
(i) To support the Afghan Government 
ISAF aimed strategically to build a strong, coherent, effective, politically stable government 
(GIRoA) that ruled with the consent of the Afghan people. However, what it had done was to 
expel from power one domestic political/religious coalition (the ‘Taliban’) and established 
another that consisted of corrupt, loosely aligned individuals and groups including the old 
Mujahidin commanders, who were intent on furthering their own individual, familial, tribal, 
territorial and/or religious interests. There then began an inter-commander war – for political 
influence, control of the opium trade, and latterly ISAF development contracts - that had 
devastating implications for Helmand. As Martin (2014, p.244) notes, NATO/ISAF strategy 
was to develop good governance, but ‘improving governance becomes a nonsensical task when 
the individuals or groups in the Government are using ISAF to prosecute their own micro-
conflicts’. ISAF continually was hamstrung by a lack of understanding of Helmandi society. 
For example, the British refused to work with the incumbent Governor, Sher Mohammadx, 
even though he was ‘…probably the most powerful man in Helmand’, and instated Governor 
Mangal who had a poor reputation among the Helmandis. The Americans spent eight years 
reliant on a few individuals (such as Mir Wali and then Haji Kadus) who manipulated them for 
personal and tribal gain.  
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(ii) To neutralize the Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants 
The identification, capturing and killing of members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda was the key 
military strategy for both American and British military forces in Helmand, and huge resource 
was devoted to this, with little appreciable effectxi. One reason for this was a failure to 
understand the nature of their ‘enemy’. ISAF insisted that the Taliban were mostly external, 
separate from both the GIRoA and local populations, unified, coherent and centralized. The 
‘Taliban’ in Helmand, however were ‘…a shifting, patronage-based franchise “organization”’ 
(Martin, 2014, p.243) consisting of a series of mahazesxii, i.e. groups of fighters under local 
commanders with strong links to local areasxiii. This meant that if a fighter was killed he tended 
to be replaced by another family member seeking revengexiv. Further, approximately 95% of 
all Taliban were Helmandisxv - villagers, farmers, patronage-seeking fighters, and local 
militiamen, whose reasons for fighting included defence of their villages and poppy crops, 
revenge, to evict foreigners, boredom, and a potent mix of internecine feuds and grievances. 
As a Helmandi milita commander said: ‘“The Taliban are the enemy…but they are local 
people, it is house on house fighting; the source of this war is the thirty years of fighting that 
has created badai on badai [revenge on revenge]”’ (Martin, 2014, p.131). In most instances the 
Taliban could only operate through ‘…personal relationships with local elders and…the 
permission of the local community’ (Martin, 2014, p.172)xvi and from 2004 onwards had the 
support of some senior GIRoA politicians.  
 
The upshot of this failure in sensemaking was that American and British military made a series 
of seemingly random and largely uncoordinated interventions with ‘…no idea as to who their 
friends or enemies were’ (Martin, 2014, p.163)xvii. The only clear-cut result of these activities 
was an intensification of violence. In this febrile milieu, ISAF forces fixated on often dubious 
information which they used to structure their operationsxviii. For example, when Mohammad 
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Hashim, a prisoner under torture in Guantanamo, mentioned that there was an al-Qaeda-funded 
terrorist unit run by a tribal leader called Baghrani this ‘unit’ became a spectre for US Special 
Forces which then drove their operations in early 2003, even though there is no evidence that 
it ever actually existedxix. An attempt by the British in 2007 to re-take the sub-district of Musa 
Qala from the Taliban and install Mullah Salam, (who was believed to be friendly to ISAF), as 
governor, and which seemed initially to be a military success, was later discovered to be a 
fiasco; it transpired that there were three people called Mullah Salam operating in the area 
representing different tribes and interests, and the British had appointed the least significant of 
them (a petty commander) to control the area, who soon proved ineffective.  
 
(iii) To provide security for the civilian population 
While ISAF strategy was to bring peace and security to Helmand, this was not evident to the 
Helmandi population in practice. The American (and from 2006 British) forces sought to 
reduce violence in the province primarily by identifying and neutralizing members and former 
members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in a mostly ad hoc manner but occasionally through ‘big 
sweep’ operations. Relying on a few tribal leaders/ex-Mujahidin commanders, often for no 
apparent reason other than that they were believed not to be aligned with the Taliban, ISAF 
forces were manipulated by these people to promote their economic interests, and to persecute 
tribal, familial and personal enemiesxx. In effect, those individuals/groups with ISAF backing 
predated on those communities which did not. Unsupported people’s, terrorized by Afghan 
‘government’ militias, with no access to Western officials, and no aid payments being made to 
them, had little choice but to join with the loose coalition badged as ‘Taliban’. Some specific 
policies, such as the US Special Forces offer of a bounty to anyone who was able to bring-in 
former members of the Taliban, particularly al-Qaeda, further intensified the personal 
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insecurity of civilians as it led to people denouncing anyone they had a feud with (including 
innocent people), in order to collect the moneyxxi.  
 
In this confused situation, local tribal commanders and their militias did what they had been 
doing for decades: they fought for power, protection, and drugs money; initiated kidnappings 
for ransom and assassinations; and brutalized each other’s civilian populations. Rather than 
bring peace and provide security ISAF forces joined in the civil war which was itself 
overwritten with ongoing spats between rivals – personal, tribal, economic etc. – which 
Western forces naively regarded as ‘Taliban’ resistance and trouble-making.  
 
(iv) To rebuild Afghanistan and its infrastructure  
The rebuilding of Helmand was always a significant aspect of ISAF – notably British and 
American – strategy rhetoric. Yet, at first, only minimal improvement work occurred.  From 
2008 ISAF (in particular America) then pumped huge resource into Helmand as the West 
sought to upgrade local infrastructure, and to build schools and clinics. This money resulted in 
remarkably little development as it was given to government officials who simply helped 
themselves and enriched their more senior sponsors: money that was sent into Afghanistan’s 
provinces moved upwards until it reached an elite in Kabul, whom the international community 
protected, from where it left the country (e.g., to bank accounts in Dubai)xxii. Helmandis blamed 
this colossal increase in corruption on foreigners’ failure to understand how systems of 
patronage worked in Afghanistan and how actually to get things done. Two other features of 
this strategy merit special mention. First, often the locals did not want the development project 
that ISAF had granted them. Second, a project that benefitted one community frequently led to 
extreme jealousy among othersxxiii. Continuously, ISAF aid teams relied on highly partisan 
individuals for guidance, and they ensured that resource was channelled to their preferred 
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tribes/regions (while often defining their enemies as ‘Taliban’)xxiv. In practice, rather than 
purchase the loyalty of Afghans, development money fed venality which fractured even further 
Helmandi societyxxv.  
 
(v) To disrupt the narcotics (specifically opium) industry  
The British and American military argued that the opium industry contributed financially to 
the Taliban (the ‘narco-insurgent nexus’) and sought to destroy itxxvi. As the lead nation charged 
with disrupting the narcotics trade, in 2002 the British sent a team to Helmand to finance a 
poppy eradication programme. However, at the request of the Governor of Helmand, Sher 
Mohammad, the team members did not leave the Bost Hotel, and the Governor was able to use 
the programme ‘…to target his rivals’ fields and compensate his friends’ (Martin, 2014, p.134). 
More fundamentally, in seeking to destroy the opium trade ISAF ignored the fact that ‘Opium 
is the Helmandi economy’ (Martin, 2014, p.246), that growers faced destitution if their crops 
were destroyed, that people joined the police and government in order to protect the opium 
trade, and in short that ‘…everyone is involved in it’ (Martin, 2014, p.246)xxvii. Targeting the 
drugs trade appalled the local population and generated resistance, especially as ISAF protected 
the Helmandi and national government officials who made money from it. Of particular note 
here were ISAF’s attempts to mentor and develop the police in order to serve and protect the 
people, not appreciating that the police in Helmand were effectively a series of squabbling local 
militias, many drawn from certain family networks and aligned with senior tribal commanders, 
whose main preoccupation was to administer the drugs trade. Other than leave some politically 
unprotected farmers/villages destitute only minimal damage was inflicted on the opium 
industry. 
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(vi) To win the hearts and minds of the people  
Integral to ISAF’s counter-insurgency narrative was the strategic requirement to win the hearts 
and minds of Helmandis. Initially, however, the British relied principally on military strength 
to accomplish mostly ad hoc goals; while the activities of American Special Forces in the 
province resembled what Martin (2014, p.127) describes as a ‘reign of terror’. Helmandis’ 
anxieties were not ameliorated by the destruction wrought by the British to people’s houses 
(labelled enemy compounds) or indeed entire towns (such as Sangin). Time and again, trusted 
‘government’ officials, in effect voracious local warlords, provided intelligence to the British 
and Americans which led them to prosecute various personal, clan and tribal feuds on their 
behalf. For example, an ex-Mujahidin commander called Dad Mohammad informed the US 
that the Ishaqzai Mistereekhel clan harboured members of the previous Taliban government 
leading US forces to persecute them and allowing Dad Mohammad to steal their drugs (Martin, 
2014, p.128). Often, there was a lack of consistency in the conduct of the ‘hearts and minds’ 
strategy. For instance, in a belated attempt in 2009 to build relations with tribal leaders in Nad-
e Ali a community council was set-up to distribute development funds, but this political work 
came to nothing as the British, having promised not to leave the area, then did so, forcing locals 
into an alliance with the Taliban to protect their poppy crop. Such actions did little to build 
rapport with Afghans, and the Helmandis came to regard the Americans with contempt 
(describing them as ‘stupid’) and the British, the historical enemy, with suspicion and hatred.  
 
Making Sense of Strategic Sensemaking/Strategizing  
In this section, I analyze what went wrong with ISAF sensemaking/strategizing focusing on 
issues of identity, extracted cues, plausibility and ‘stickiness’. Martin (2014) catalogues 
multiple instances – at different levels of analysis and with varying time frames – of what may 
be regarded as ‘paradigmatic’ examples of Weick’s conception of sensemaking, i.e. those 
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instances in which people retrospectively discern cues, and make seemingly plausible identity-
consonant speculations in order to explain them which are shared socially, rendering ‘…the 
subjective into something more tangible’ (Weick, 1995, p.14). Unfortunately, as Martin’s 
(2014) account illustrates, people may continuously ‘…realize their reality by “reading into” 
their situation patterns of significant meaning’ (Morgan et al., 1983, p.24) which are, arguably, 
fundamentally flawed. A group’s commitment to a particular frame ‘imposes a form of logic 
on the[ir] interpretation of action’ (Weick, 1995, p.159), but this does not guarantee the 
appropriateness or efficacy of that interpretation or its correlative action(s).  
 
A key plank of Weick’s conception of sensemaking is that it is tied intimately to identity: 
‘Depending on who I am, my definition of what is “out there” will also change’ (Weick, 1995, 
p.21). In this instance, the insurgency narrative to which ISAF adhered positioned them 
primarily as a military force rather than, say, as keeping the peace during a civil war, which 
would have constituted them as a peacekeeping force, and allowed very different forms of 
action. As Martin (2014, p.188) observes, the British and Americans defined ‘the situation 
through the prism of their own existence’ and this ‘…is why the “insurgency narrative” exists 
and is so resilient: it is linked intimately to ISAF’s self-image and role in Afghanistan’. One 
explanation why there was so little questioning of the insurgency framing of events is because 
‘…sensemaking occurs in the service of maintaining a consistent, positive self-conception’ 
(Weick, 1995, p.23). Sensemaking may have ‘…a strong reflexive quality’ (Weick, 1995, 
p.15), but a capacity for reflexivity does not necessarily result in adaptive learning, especially 
when this would require potentially critical self-reflection. Further, ‘…what we enact and how 
we interpret…affects what outsiders think we are (image) and how they treat us, which 
stabilizes or destabilizes our identity’ (Weick et al., 2005, p.416). In this respect, Martin (2014, 
p.196) comments:  
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‘Helmandis, the greatest natural politicians that I have ever met, understood how ISAF 
conceptualized the conflict and presented information to them within an 
insurgency/counterinsurgency conceptual framework. This enabled them to continue 
manipulating the outsiders as before’.  
 
Sensemaking is focused on and by extracted cues which ‘…become salient as a consequence 
of context’ (Weick, 1995, p.53) and ‘…tie elements together cognitively’ (Weick, 1995, p.54). 
It is ‘faith’ in these cues which sustains their ‘use as a reference point’ rendering them 
‘important for sensemaking’ (Weick, 1995, p.53) not least because they facilitate action. That 
is, ‘In matters of sensemaking, believing is seeing’ (Weick, 1995, p.133). It is faith in the cueing 
information they relied upon to structure their understanding that perhaps, in part, explains why 
the British stuck rigidly to the strategy of installing the ‘wrong’ Mullah Salam as governor of 
Musa Qala. The importance of extracted cues in patterning action is illustrated also by the US 
Special Forces fixation on finding a supposed al-Qaeda-funded terrorist unit run by Baghrani. 
In these and countless other instances ISAF forces relied on information which animated 
actions generating outcomes (more cues) helping them to discover retrospectively what was 
occurring, but this sensemaking was hermetically sealed by commitment to an insurgency 
narrative: this meant that for the British, appointing the wrong Mullah Salam was a ‘better’ 
outcome than leaving the Taliban in control of Musa Qala; and for the Americans, ‘seek and 
destroy’ missions against the Taliban were sensible and justified whether or not the unit they 
were notionally pursuing actually existed.  
 
Sensemaking involves people in a quest for plausibility, coherence, reasonableness and 
instrumentality; if notional ‘accuracy’ matters it is only within a particular frame and for 
pragmatic reasons, because ‘…people see and find sensible those things they can do something 
about’ (Weick, 1995, p.60). For ISAF troops operating on the ground the idea that ‘All possible 
truth is practical’ (Hall, 1878, cited in Sills and Merton, 1991, p.84 cited in Weick, 1995, p.59) 
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would doubtless have had considerable resonance. What is regarded as plausible, practical truth 
is guided by expectations which filter inputs such that people ‘…assimilate whatever is seen to 
whatever is expected’ (Weick, 1995, p.146). Further, ‘The more expected an event, the more 
easily it is seen or heard’ (Bruner, 1986, p.46). In short, because sensemaking tends ‘…to be 
schema driven rather than evidence driven’ (Weick, 1995, p.153), if a group strongly expects 
to find Taliban insurgents terrorizing innocent local populations, then that is what they will 
find. Then, taking committed action, such as attacking ‘Taliban’, further binds people to the 
sensemaking which prompts it. Irrevocable decisions of this kind provide ‘…the pillar around 
which the cognitive apparatus must be draped’ (Kiesler, 1971, p.17). The commitment which 
led to action ties people to the beliefs that sustain further similar patterns of action (cf. Salancik, 
1977, p.62). Commitment has ‘epistemological consequences’ (Weick, 1995, p.162) which can 
have catastrophic implications for action.  
 
What is surprising, and most in need of explanation, is the apparent ‘stickiness’ of ISAF’s 
dominant sensemaking story (i.e. the insurgency narrative). Weick’s theorizing provides 
several further related lines of reasoning that are helpful here: ‘A socially constructed world is 
a stable world, made stable by behaviorally confirmed expectations’ (Weick, 1995, p.154) so 
changes in patterns of sensemaking and action often take (considerable) time. This is consistent 
with other theorizing – drawn on by Weick – which suggests that ‘…once a tentative 
explanation has taken hold of our mind, information to the contrary may produce not 
corrections but elaborations of the explanation’ (Watzlawick 1976, p.50). Indeed, Weick (1995, 
p.84) writes of ‘…the ease with which delusions take hold and endure’ and how sensemaking, 
if regarded as plausible, may persistently be ‘…sealed off from refutation’ and exhibit ‘self-
sealing logics’ which narrow people’s attention. In those instances characterized by multiple 
discrepancies, ambiguities, and novelties, where there is extreme equivocality, arousal can lead 
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people to narrow and focus their attention, to ignore ‘…cues that are crucial for performance’ 
(Weick, 1995, p.102) and ‘…to fall back on earlier, overlearned, often simpler responses’ 
(Weick, 1995, p.102). What this implies is that sensemaking is an effortful and sometimes 
costly process that requires people to feel sufficiently motivated to surrender their existing 
accounts of the world and develop new understandings (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014, p.77). 
But this was not the case in this instance, where a strong identity and both ideological and 
behavioural commitment ‘“buffered”’ actors from potential sensemaking triggers’ (Maitlis and 
Christianson, 2014, p.78).  
 
Strategic Enactment 
Enactment refers to those processes of action which people engage in, and in doing so, create 
the matrix of opportunities and constraints they then face. In Helmand, the strategies of the 
Americans and the British, created the environment in which they operated, enacting conditions 
which led directly to the re-establishment of the Taliban. The GIRoA, which they supported, 
was weak, corrupt and factionalized, and the police ineffective. The ISAF strategy of 
strengthening the provincial government in Helmand in fact insulated it ‘…against the 
population’ (Martin, 2014, p.251). Western powers were unable to provide security for the 
civilian population, meaningfully to rebuild Afghanistan and its infrastructure, intent on 
disrupting the narcotics industry on which people’s livelihoods depended, confused and 
inconsistent in their operations, incapable of discerning who or what the Taliban were, and 
despised by Helmandis. These deficiencies were, moreover, embedded in a broader failing to 
understand the Helmandi people, their history and culture: while over time British knowledge 
increased it was ‘…never really enough to stop them being manipulated’ (Martin, 2014, p.158). 
Three specific aspects deserve special mention.  
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First, ISAF never fully appreciated what Jean Mackenzie, an American journalist, has 
described as Helmandis ‘…deep, visceral aversion toward the British that defies rational 
explanation’ (Martin, 2014, p.226). Helmandis are brought-up on stories of resistance to British 
colonial oppression. While the old Taliban networks were already strengthening such that 
towards the end of 2005 the province ‘was approaching near anarchy’ (Martin, 2014, p.143), it 
was the arrival of the British that helped the “Taliban” to consolidate and coalesce:  groups 
persecuted by ISAF and Afghan government forces were joined by others that had actually 
been part of the UN-backed government and benefitted from US protectionxxviii.  The British 
intervention was ‘…a godsend for the Taliban movement’ (Martin, 2014, p.172). Funding and 
recruitment were from then on ‘non-issues for them’ (Martin, 2014, p.172). Local Helmandis 
were aghast that the British were in their province, and the Taliban leadership in Quetta Shura 
skilfully took advantage of the situation by promoting the narrative that they were in Helmand 
to defeat the British. Indeed, although the Taliban were rooted in Helmandi society, the British 
presence helped to suck-in increasing numbers of foreigners – notably from Pakistan and 
Chechnya – who came to wage jihad against them.  
 
Second, from late 2004 the UN administered a Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration Process (DDR) in which the four main commanders - Sher Mohammad, Mir 
Wali, Dad Mohammad and Abdul Rahman - and many subsidiary commanders, were supposed 
to be removed and disarmed. In effect, all that happened was that these commanders 
‘…changed from working under the “government” patronage network…to working under a 
“Taliban” patronage network’ (Martin, 2014, p.142). Confusingly for ISAF, Mir Wali and Sher 
Mohammad, the two greatest side-switchers to the ‘Taliban’, retained their positions as an MP 
and a senator respectively (Martin, 2014, p.145). This meant that the Taliban and the GIRoA 
were not distinct entities, and that the Taliban were now connected at the highest political 
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levels, making a mockery of ISAF’s supposed goal of eliminating them. Again, it illustrates 
how in enacting a specific and (to ISAF members) seemingly sensible strategy to improve the 
governance of Afghanistan, they in fact strengthened Taliban networks and ensured that they 
were linked (and protected by ISAF) to the ruling political elite. As Gioa (2006, p.1715) 
comments: ‘…we create what we confront’.  
 
Third, for Helmandis, the notion that the US and British were unable to understand the internal 
social, political and religious dynamics which were fundamental to their society was 
incomprehensible: the foreigners, especially the British, they reasoned, must have an ulterior 
motive for being there (Martin, 2014, p.138)xxix. In the main, they concluded that the British 
were seeking to destroy their province through an alliance with the Quetta Shura Taliban based 
in Pakistan and supported by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)xxx. Of course, 
Helmandis’ sensemaking was, naturally enough given the confused state of the province, far 
from monolithic, though always motivated by ‘a profound hatred of the Angrez’ (Martin, 2014, 
p.226)xxxi. Some of the many hypotheses in evidence were that while the British supported the 
Taliban the Americans were fighting themxxxii, that the UK and America were fighting a proxy 
war in their province, that the British and ISI wanted to ferment an Islamic war in Afghanistan 
so that Islam in the region was compromised, and even that Britain wanted to damage NATO 
in order to re-establish its empirexxxiii. As a result, Helmandis – or at least significant numbers 
of them – came to believe that they were fighting a war against colonial oppression, rendering 
the Taliban franchise a useful ally at a time of need. ISAF wanted there to be a Taliban 
insurgency and so enacted one: at first this was (arguably) as much a linguistic construct as a 
material one, though ultimately, ironically, it became all too ‘real’ as ISAF’s initial ‘bet’ 
transformed into a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
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Epilogue 
In July 2010 ISAF declared it would withdraw its forces by 2014, and control over large areas 
was returned officially to Afghans through 2011-2013. The British/ISAF strategy of 
withdrawal in Helmand was supposed to be accompanied by the formation of village militias 
and local police forces (Afghan Local Police or ALP) which could protect their communities. 
A lack of British ‘due diligence’ though meant it was often unclear who was being armed. The 
ALP did not always have the support of what were sometimes fractured local communities, 
and many responded with alacrity to the opportunity to eradicate the poppies of poor farmers 
(labelled ‘Taliban’) for which they were paid a cash bonus of up to $1000 a day. Sometimes 
actual Taliban fighters joined ALPs (or reached understandings with the ALPs that their 
brethren now ran) and some ALPs even overtly re-badged themselves as ‘Taliban’. In one 
instance, two local competing tribes both formed ALPs and, armed by the British, carried on 
their long-running disputes. The training and recruitment of new ALPs was halted nationwide 
in September 2012 as it had become clear that they served to reinforce local politics and 
rivalries rather than the Afghan state. Yet violence did diminish as, in effect, ISAF was paying 
Taliban-affiliates not to fight. Those who benefitted most, however, were the old commanders 
whose men were now re-badged as ALP:   
‘The ISAF narrative of bringing good governance in the wake of the rapacious warlords was 
somewhat contradicted by the fact that those same warlords regained security control through 
the ALP programme’ (Martin, 2014, p.222).  
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this section, I consider several additional ways in which Martin’s (2014) account of the war 
in Afghanistan might be theorized using a Weickian approach, some Weick-inspired practical 
advice for strategists, and a few limitations of the analysis I have offered; I then draw brief 
conclusions.  
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A substantial number of interrelated analyses of strategy failure in Afghanistan based on 
Weick’s work might be elaborated. It could be theorized as failure due to strong commitment 
to a single frame which enforced ‘premise controls’ constituting ‘professional blind spots’ 
(Perrow, 1986). One aspect of this was that there was no specific crisis (a low-probability high-
impact event threatening the viability of ISAF) that demanded the attention of strategists and 
policymakers; in times of war there are many intensely problematic events, and the threshold 
for an occurrence to be evaluated as a crisis – especially one that shatters fundamental 
assumptions – is relatively high as a result. It could be argued that normalization militated 
against effective pattern recognition such that, for example, incidents where Helmandis were 
known to have manipulated ISAF to prosecute feuds came to be regarded as occasional 
accompaniments rather than symptoms of an underlying failure to grasp fully the situation. 
This may have been allied to ‘positive asymmetry’ which results in people foregrounding 
‘…the best characteristics and potentials of people, places, objects, and events’ (Cerulo, 2006, 
p.6), a tendency that can be institutionalized into organizational practices and strategies, 
desensitizing them from cues that in this case may have led them to question the motives of 
those ISAF relied on for information.  
 
An alternative explanation for ISAF’s strategy failure might implicate the concept of 
‘simplexity’ (Colville et al., 2012). This suggests that theirs was a failure to combine 
appropriately the requirement for requisite complexity of thought together with necessary 
simplicity of action. ‘Sensemaking is…a balance of making sense through thinking and acting’ 
(Colville et al., 2012, p.7) but this is hard to sustain when actors have no sensible stock of 
knowledge to draw on. In these circumstances what is thought to be ‘context’ may be ‘…a 
premature cognitive commitment’ (Langer, 1989, p.37) from which things are seen that from 
other, more grounded vantages, do not exist. From a simplexity perspective, ISAF’s problem 
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was that it leapt to act before sufficiently complicating its understanding, i.e. it failed to get an 
appropriate balance between thought and action, enacting an environment that jarred with the 
views of locals. The self-sustaining logics which dictated action were then held in place by a 
militaristic emphasis on top-down coordination and control (of decision premises) unleavened 
by sufficient creativity, imagination, improvisation or a reflexive quest for wisdom. The result 
was a conceptual frame that remained ‘blind to granularity of subtle difference within the cues 
of current experience’ (Colville, et. al., 2012, p.9; cf. Coville et. al., 2013).  
 
How, then, might these failings have been addressed? One antidote to mutually reinforcing 
patterns of sensemaking-organizing-enacting based on self-justification and confirmation bias 
is ‘…the enactment of doubt…in order to expose wishful interpretations’ (Weick, 2010, p.547; 
Kramer, 2007). This means organizing an ability to doubt existing (putative) insights, 
embracing contradiction, being genuinely open to new information and perhaps even seeking 
out controversy, none of which possibilities ISAF forces entertained. It would have meant 
being sufficiently alert (so as to notice discrepancies between the insurgency frame and actual 
events), aware (in order to generate conjectures about what anomalies implied) and prescient 
(so as to know what needed to be known) (Weick, 2010, p.545; Corley and Gioia, 2011). Such 
a disposition implies organizing for ‘high reliability’: dispensing with simplifying abstractions, 
learning from failures, and attending to the complexity of on-the-ground operations. In sum, 
problems centred on sensemaking might have been combatted through the kind of ‘complex 
sensemaking’ (Weick, 1993, 1995) that is associated with critical self-reflexivity, that is, the 
wisdom that derives from an ability to perceive ‘the interconnectedness of things’ (Bigelow, 
1992, p.147) and an abandonment of narcissistic assumptions of omniscience and omnipotence 
(Brown and Starkey, 2000).  
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Finally, the analysis offered here incorporates many of the limitations of the Weick-inspired 
sensemaking perspective. This reading of the war in Afghanistan has, arguably, under-
emphasized the importance of institutional and societal contexts. I have hinted that ‘…social 
context is crucial for sensemaking because it binds people to actions that they then must justify’ 
(Weick, 1995, p.53) and that this social context is highly politicized: ‘Interpretations can have 
no grounding outside of rhetorical exchanges taking place within institutional and cultural 
politics’ (Mailloux, 1990, p.133). Nevertheless, there remains scope for enriching micro studies 
of sensemaking with an increased sensitivity to institutions, cultures and societies. Further, 
taking my lead from Weick and the sensemaking community generally, I have said little about 
how sensemaking is tied to emotions (though this is beginning to be addressed, e.g., Maitlis 
and Sonenshein, 2010; Maitlis, 2013; Weick et al., 1995, p.146), prospective sensemaking (cf. 
MacKay, 2009; Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012; Gephart et al., 2010), or the role of the body – 
perception, speech etc. – in sensemaking (Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012). Perhaps most 
perplexing of all, Weick is not interested in how processes of sensemaking are implicated in 
relations of power (Helms et al., 2010; Marshall and Rollinson, 2004); though while omitted 
from this study, I have tackled this issue elsewhere (Brown, 1998; Brown and Humphreys, 
2006).  
 
Conclusions 
My analysis of Martin’s (2014) account of the war in Afghanistan has shown how situations 
and environments ‘…are talked into existence’ (Weick, 2006, p.1725) through processes of 
noticing and bracketing which simplify the world and focus attention, allowing the generation 
of a locally plausible sensemaking narrative. Such sensemaking is ‘not about truth’ but 
elaboration of the story such that it becomes sufficiently comprehensive to be ‘…resilient in 
the face of criticism’ (Weick, et al., 2005, p.415). Infused with the spirit of American 
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pragmatism ISAF forces’ hypotheses and postulates triggered action which not only 
transformed Afghanistan but helped ‘…to make the truth which they declare[d]’ (James, 1992, 
p.908). Significant cues – such as obvious manipulations of ISAF by tribal leaders and 
distraught villagers horrified that their only source of income (poppy) was being destroyed – 
were ignored by those blinded by their commitment to their ‘…selections of reality’ (Burke, 
1945/1969. p.45). ISAF forces enacted an ongoing crisis in which their denuded sensemaking 
led to inappropriate actions which fed a vicious circle that continually threatened and ultimately 
undermined its most fundamental goals. A Weickian reading of what has happened thus 
(unsurprisingly) tallies with Martin’s (2014, p.233) conclusion that ‘…in intervening without 
the required knowledge of local politics, outsiders have made the conflict worse’xxxiv.  
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Table 1 
 
Selected Glossary of Terms and People 
 
Abdul Rahman  Tribal leader and fighter 
Baghrani   Tribal leader and fighter 
Dad Mohammad  Mujahidin commander, ally of the Taliban and Kharzai 
government, and then head of the Afghan National Directorate 
of Security 
GIRoA   Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
Haji Kadus   Mir Wali’s subordinate on whom the US relied for 8 years 
Hamid Kharzai  President of Afghanistan 2001-2014 
ISAF    International Security Assistance Force  
Ishaqzai Mistereekhel  An Afghani tribe 
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s premier intelligence 
agency, with strong links to the Helmandi Taliban 
Mangal   Governor of Helmand 2008-2012 
Mir Wali   Mujahidin commander and then MP 
Mohamed Hashim  Guantanamo prisoner 
Mujahadin   ‘Holy warriors’. Both those who historically fought against the 
     Soviets and those who then fought against the GIRoA called 
themselves ‘mujahadin’ 
Nad-e Ali   Area of Helmand Province, Afghanistan 
Salam (Mullah)  Petty Taliban commander made district governor of Musa Qala  
in 2007 by the British 
Osama bin Laden  Head of the al Qaeda network 
Quetta Shura Taliban  The leadership shura of the Taliban in Pakistan 
Sher Mohammad  Tribal leader, Governor of Helmand 2001-2005, then a senator 
Taliban   Originally a movement of religious clerics,  
ideologically committed to their interpretation of Islam, and 
latterly a loose coalition/franchise movement opposed to 
Western occupation and the GIRoA   
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Table 2 
 
Timeline of Selected Key Events Affecting Helmand 
 
1839–1842   First Anglo-Afghan War  
1878–1880   Second Anglo-Afghan War  
1919    Third Anglo-Afghan War  
 
1978    Saur revolution (Communist coup) 
December 1979  Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
1988/89   Soviet withdrawal 
 
1992-2001   Increasing and then dominant influence of Pakistan in the 
context of continuing civil war  
1995    Taliban establish control of Helmand 
 
11 September 2001  al-Qaeda attacks against the US   
October 2001 US (and some UK) forces work with the Northern Alliance to 
topple the Taliban. The GIRoA is established under President 
Karzai 
2002    US ‘Special Forces’ deploy to Helmand 
2004    UN administered Disarmament, Demobilization and 
     Reintegration Process (DDR) leading to the strengthening 
of Taliban networks 
2006    British forces deploy to Helmand (regarded by Helmandis 
as the Fourth Anglo-Afghan War) 
2008    Governor Mangal appointed 
2008-    Increasing emphasis on development led to huge sums of  
money being distributed and corruption was rife    
2009-2012   America surges up to 20,000 troops into Helmand  
2010    ISAF attempts to create an effective Afghan Local Police (ALP)  
July 2010   ISAF declares it will withdraw its forces by 2014 
2011-    The British begin to retreat and cede control of large areas 
of Helmand to locals 
2012 Governor Mangal sacked. The training and recruitment of new 
ALPs halted. 
2014    Full ISAF withdrawal 
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Notes 
i In February 2014 the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) asked for the book to be pulped, claiming it breached 
the Official Secrets Act and used classified material uncovered by Wikileaks founder Julian Assange. Dr Martin 
and his publisher denied this, but as a result, the 31-year-old author quit the military in disgust after serving for 
ten years.  
ii Three of the most obvious in-practice limitations, are that Martin’s (2014) (and so my) analysis: (i) focuses not 
on Afghanistan in general but Helmand, the largest Afghan province, in particular; (ii) is less concerned with 
NATO/ISAF than the activities of the American and especially British military; and (iii) weaves together a 
somewhat curious mix of history, policy, incident and anecdote from which clarity (at least to this reader) does 
not always emerge.  
iii No further details regarding this data set are provided and it is undated and not referenced.  
iv He reports that a Helmandi suggested he [Martin] knew ‘…about 1 percent of what went on’ (p.158), and 
Martin himself writes that ‘Helmandis continually manipulated me’ (p.158).  
vThe British Army definition of an insurgency is: ‘…an organized, violent subversion used to effect or prevent 
political control, as a challenge to established authority’ (quoted in Martin p.248).   
vi In Afghanistan there is a long-standing tendency to produce local warlords who exert political power by dint 
of military might. 
vii Traditionally, Pushtun society is governed by three power structures, tribal, state and religious, which overlap 
and pull people in different directions, causing considerable disequilibrium. 
viii  Indeed, even small villages may be divided into clans which harbour their own inter-clan grudges 
ix Primogeniture is not a feature of Pushtun society and consequently cousin warfare is exceptionally common 
as they contest violently their grandfather’s land inheritance. 
x Sher Mohammad was tribal head of the Alizai and Mir Wali tribal head of the Barakzai, (the two largest tribes 
in Helmand). Abdul Rahman was the most prominent member of the third largest tribe, the Noorzai, and held 
the balance of power. There were continuing alliances, competition, and tensions between the three men, much 
of it centred on control of the drugs trade. The fourth major tribe were the Kharoti. 
xi By mid-2010 there were 30,000 ISAF troops in Helmand tasked with fighting a counter-insurgency.  
xii Of course, ‘The Taliban is evolving as a movement’ (Martin, 2014, p.208). From 2008 the Taliban central 
leadership tried to enact a centralized nezami (organized system) under Zakir (a prominent commander), and 
funding was channelled down this single chain to decrease factionalism. Money generated in the Middle East 
was used by the Quetta Shura to create a patronage network that transferred funds through Pakistan to 
Afghanistan. In other provinces the nezami system has been successful, but Helmand has resisted the system 
for three reasons: i. there is huge resource in Helmand: income from drugs, ISAF supply contracts and 
development funds much of which is diverted (e.g. by government figures who are also Taliban commanders) 
to support the mahazes. As money could be made from other sources, so the nezami system had no sway; ii. the 
hierarchical Pushtun tribal system supports the mahaz system in which key families cycle resources and land 
maintaining social stability; iii. there is competition for influence from Iran which has strengthened its 
interactions with some mahaz commanders, seeking to protect its water supplies and the Shia population in 
Afghanistan. The Mahaz commanders in Helmand continue to act at least semi-independently.  
xiii Mahaz commanders ranged in prestige depending on their standing in Helmandi society. Often an area had 
different mahazes answering to different leaders with different sources of funding, and conflict between them 
was not uncommon.  
xiv In some instances families and communities sent their young men/sons to fight with different Taliban groups 
for protection.  
xv There is, moreover, a fundamental distinction to be made between those mahazes featuring the ‘aslee’ (real) 
Taliban and those characterized as the ‘daakhlee’ (internal Helmandi) Taliban. The ‘aslee’ are those whose 
leaders have strong links to the Quetta Shura in Pakistan, and are supported by the ISI which provides them with 
resources and ‘professional’ skills such as bomb construction. It is these people who commit acts that local 
Taliban would not countenance such as burning schools. One subset of these are the akidawee (ideological) 
Taliban who fight in response to jihad obligations. The Daakhlee Taliban, who comprised the overwhelming 
majority of all ‘Taliban’ were in fact local Helmandis with deep roots in their community and personal reasons 
for fighting.   
xvi ‘The community replaced fighters if they were wounded or killed’ (Martin, 2014, p.172). 
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xvii Another complicating factor that militated against military success was that there was little coordination 
between the British and American forces in Helmand, and some US/British tensions, which were skilfully 
exploited by local Helmandis for their own benefit.  
xviii Those on whom ISAF forces relied learned very quickly to represent their aggression in terms consistent with 
British and American strategies, generally as ‘attacks against the Taliban’ or ‘drugs raids on smugglers’.  
xix Baghrani was already a target for American search and capture operations because he had been labelled as 
‘Taliban’ by his tribal enemies, Mir Wali and Sher Mohammad.  
xx For example, wishing to establish checkpoints in Babaji, the British used guides from the Barakzai tribe; this 
dismayed the elders of mixed communities in the area who were being attacked by members of the Barakzai.  
xxi Once arrested, a prisoner often was sent to Guantanamo Bay prison.  
xxii ISAF officials were evidently aware of corruption but did nothing, damaging further its reputation with 
Helmandis.  
xxiii As one interviewee said to Martin, “jealousy is the biggest enemy of all’ (Martin, 2014, p.138).  
xxiv ‘The US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was physically protected by Abdul Rahman’s men, so it became 
impossible for non-allied communities to access US decision-makers or resources’ (Martin, 2014, p.138).  
xxv Development projects sometimes caused great resentment. The US strategy was to re-build the Kajaki dam 
(a $226m project) in southern Afghanistan to provide water and power. The Alizai who lived around the dam 
would not benefit from it and wanted an irrigation canal. They were also worried that the foreigners would 
eradicate their poppy crop. Iran was concerned that a dam would mean that less water would flow into their 
Sistani region and sponsored fighting groups. Those fighting considered themselves resistance fighters and were 
supported by local communities: resistance was strong.  
xxvi The CIA gave this argument little credence.  
xxvii Helmand is an agricultural society, the crop of choice is opium poppy, and the province produces 
approximately ninety percent of Afghanistan’s opium.  
xxviii The British deployed to Helmand largely because the Canadians wanted Kandahar and the Dutch wanted 
Uruzgan. Unaware of these machinations the Helmandis themselves, including some in government, were 
puzzled why the ‘hated’ British, were returning after 126 years. 
xxix Their suspicions were raised further when they witnessed US and British talk about rebuilding the country 
contradicted by actions in which they beat people to death in custody, sent children to Guantanamo, promoted 
cruel and despicable people to positions of power, paid money to Taliban members, and generally operated a 
regime of violence.  
xxx According to Martin (2014, p.273) the ISI ‘Heavily financed the Taliban during 1995-2001’ and there is ‘strong 
evidence that they are currently providing assistance to the Taliban Quetta Shura’.  
xxxi While some did disparage the British and Americans as ‘stupid’, generally there was a failure among 
Helmandis to realize that Westerners were unknowingly politically supporting, militarily arming and paying 
money to members of the Taliban. The apparently ‘more reasonable’ argument made was that the British did 
not give up colonial control of Pakistan after its partition from India in 1947 because no country would voluntarily 
give up power, Pakistan controls the ISI, and the ISI controls the Taliban. Additional support for this narrative 
was provided by the oft-mentioned ‘facts’ that the Pakistani state has changed little since 1947, the Pakistani 
Army is modelled on the British Army, and Britain gives aid to Pakistan (and so either directly or indirectly funds 
the Taliban). Iranian and Pakistani authorities encouraged these views. The ISI told their own Taliban 
commanders that the money and weapons they supplied them with came from the British. Certainly, there were 
Taliban commanders who believed that there was a deal with the British and were piqued when they were 
attacked by them. Those Martin interviewed reported multiple incidents where the British had unwittingly 
supplied the Taliban or colluded with them, ‘proving’ that they were allies.  
xxxii Martin (2014) notes also that there were well-established narratives that the Americans supported the 
Taliban by sponsoring the ISI and through supply contracts.  
xxxiii More senior Helmandi commanders realized that the idea Western powers supported the Taliban was 
ridiculous, but only because they had actual experience of dealing with the British and Americans and realized 
how ignorant and incompetent they were.  
xxxiv The ‘much-vaunted Taliban reconciliation process’ (Martin, 2014, p.245) seems destined to fail. Even if its 
leaders can be persuaded to make peace, they have little influence over individual actors fighting in Helmand 
‘…the overwhelming majority of whom are fighting for personal reasons’ (Martin, 2014, p.245). Those fighting 
to protect their drugs crops will continue to do so, while states such as Iran and especially Pakistan have a strong 
vested interest in an unstable Afghanistan.  
 
